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Response
Gretel S. Figueroa
I. Introduction
Professor Sakamoto has presented us a paper with a large vision
and many interesting and specific ideas. I will respond by commenting on those points I found most arresting.
II. A Critique
A. Unipolar World Military Order
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has
risen to the top of the global military ladder. Professor Sakamoto
points out that this military advantage is still not universal or
strong enough to establish peace and order in the post – Cold
War world. Why? According to Sakamoto, military power alone
cannot control the forces created by the three other world developments: the universality of the capitalist world market, the universalization of nationalism, and the globalization of
democracy.
I agree, but I would also add that it is not only the power of
these “new” developments that seem to check the United States’
military omnipotence. I feel that one of the leading forces limiting the power of the U.S. military position is this nation’s foreign policy driven by “self-interest.” Like other nations, our
country often finds itself in heated national debates at each
international crisis. In this particular debate, the demand of
American citizens (through their congressmen and senators) is
heard rather clearly. They ask that its military force and economic resources not be deployed in the “internal affairs” of
other nations unless their interests (economic and, thus, political)
are threatened. It is in this way that the United States only
grudgingly chooses to exercise its global military advantage in
economically poor countries like Bosnia, Serbia, Liberia, and
Rwanda while reacting almost instantaneously in countries like
Kuwait. Poor countries used to interest the United States when
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the threat of communism was “real” and its citizens could readily identify with this political threat. In the post – Cold War
world, however, the internal conditions of poor countries are of
very little interest to the U.S. The potential economic gains that
would accompany the establishment of order via military intervention often pale in comparison to the potential human and
economic loss that could come with this intervention. Moreover,
it can be argued that the United States is pushed to take a military stance in poorer nations only when human rights atrocities
have reached such a public and visible level that inaction would
hurt “U.S. credibility.”
I want to be clear that I am in no way calling for increased
U.S. military intervention in developing nations. I am, however,
questioning the selection criteria that seem to drive this nation’s
foreign policy, which, in my view, should move beyond simple
“self-interest” and toward interest in the dignity of the human
race. The unipolarization of military power is not a hopeful
manifestation of the deeper process of “internationalism” or an
“eroding nation-state system,” as Professor Sakamoto implies.
Although it is true that the United States could never establish a
global order on the basis of its military prowess alone, it could
use its unmatchable military power to take a larger role in establishing order and peace in the world. The greatest barrier to this
is its unwillingness to do so when it is not in its best economic
interest.
B. Single Capitalist Global Market
Professor Sakamoto argues that, along with the aforementioned
unipolarization of military power, the rise of the single capitalist
global market is a reflection of the trend toward “internationalization,” which “cuts across national boundaries, transcending
and eroding the nation-state system.” Yet, is the nation-state
system eroding in the advent of this single capitalist market?
On September 12, 1994, the Minneapolis Star Tribune
reprinted an article written by Thomas L. Friedman for the New
York Times titled “World Peace through Economics.” Needless to
say, I was intrigued by the title of Friedman’s article, and I
believe it can help make the link between the state of “nation-
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states” and the globalization of a single capitalist market that
Professor Sakamoto does not clearly make in this section.
Friedman points to the unexpected outbreak of peace in the
Middle East, South Africa, and Northern Ireland and asks if
Adam Smith’s beneficial “invisible hand” of free markets could
be linked to positive changes in recent history. “The short
answer,” writes Friedman, “is that there is something to this
argument. Changes in the global economy have helped crack all
three of these conflicts,” as seemingly irreconcilable ethnic and
cultural differences have yielded to the mutual benefits that
could be obtained by a peaceful nation participating in the
larger global market. One indication of this trend for Friedman
is that “the value of a peace accord used to be measured by the
number of lives saved; now, it is also measured by the number
of jobs created.” However, he also warns us to “forget all that
‘end of history stuff’ because in some unanticipated ways the
marketplace may be sharpening ethnic tensions as well.” He
notes that the more people are asked to integrate with distant,
impersonal economic structures, the more they want to assert
their own particular local or national identity. Or, as he puts it,
“the more the world beckons from one side, the louder the call
of the tribe, the family, the neighborhood from the other.” The
trick, in Friedman’s eyes, is to find a balance between the need
for personal identity and the lure of the capitalist global market.
Yet, I think Friedman’s analysis also demonstrates that
whether a people choose to fight for personal/ethnic identity or
a more pluralistic nation-state, the global market moves and
grows as nation-states peddle their goods and protect (at the
very least) their own economic self-interest or advantage.
A clear example of this symbiosis of the nation-state and the
market can be seen with the resurgence of neomercantilism in
the Clinton Administration. Here, we see a renewed focus on
government policies that work to insure national dominance in
specific global markets. This, coupled with the belief that we are
seeing the emergence of the first single capitalist market in history, can lead one to conclude that the nation-state of the future
will have to begin to assume the responsibility of protecting its
people’s unique cultural identity if the “balance” Friedman
speaks of is to be found. Thus, the nation-state, I argue, does not
seem destined to fade because of the emergence of the single
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capitalist market, for markets need a level of political stability
that can be provided only by nation-states.
C. The Universalization of Nationalism
Professor Sakamoto carefully traces how nationalism, which
originated in the West, spread with the massive tricontinental
decolonization and national liberation movements after WWII
and then moved to the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc.
Unfortunately, I fail to see how this movement can be a manifestation of the “trend toward international equality or equality of
nations,” as he later asserts. I see an inherent contradiction
between nationalism — which implies separation and division
from other nations of the world — and an international equality
or equality of nations that brings forth an entirely opposite
vision of the world. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the
constant problems the UN finds when attempting to enforce a
resolution needing multinational support. Here is an international body that is constantly paralyzed by the growing nationalism of its members. Should not this trend toward
“international equality or equality of nations” be seen in this of
all institutions?
D. The Globalization of Democracy
The fourth and final trend Professor Sakamoto notes is the universalization of democracy, which he argues is “the manifestation of the struggle for and the establishment of the equality of
universal human rights.” I find this statement unclear. I interpret “democracy” as government by the people either directly
or through representatives. By this definition, what people ask
their governmental representatives to do or do themselves does
not guarantee a final outcome such as “equality of human
rights.” However, if by this statement Professor Sakamoto is
arguing that the growing number of democracies is a manifestation of the revolutions by people who saw the right to participate in government as part of their human rights, I cannot refute
this explanation.
Yet, I would caution his optimistic outlook for the future of
democracy. For although “antidemocracy cannot claim legiti204
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macy” in most people’s eyes, this is hardly a guarantee that the
spread of democracy will become universal. If we agree that
democracy is a government of the people, many populist
regimes have come to power with their people’s support but
refuse to practice democratic principles. Civil wars that tear a
nation apart often push many toward appealing to “undemocratic” leaders.
Even more disconcerting, not all democratic elections guarantee the preservation of democracy. One example of this is the
recent elections in Algeria in which an “Islamic fundamentalist”
government was “democratically elected” while openly campaigning that, if elected, they would establish a new state that
would no longer hold elections. If the world is moving toward a
democracy of nations, as Professor Sakamoto argues, how can
one accommodate the possibility that a nation may choose not to
be a democracy?
II. Dialectics of Modern History
In the second part of Professor Sakamoto’s paper, he explains
what he sees as the fundamental contradictions underlying the
historical change in modern times. These contradictions are (a)
capitalism vs. socialism, (b) state nationalism vs. internationalism, and (c) democracy vs. authoritarianism.
Although it must be said that finding the engines of modern
historical change is quite a noble and useful endeavor, it is very
difficult to complete. I do not mean to be overly critical; however, I do see some problems with this analysis. For instance,
what Professor Sakmoto defines as “modern history” is, at the
very least, debatable, as are his “engines.” “By modern history,
we refer to the period since the latter half of the eighteenth century,” he states; however, the terminology he uses to describe
these engines of change are concepts formed in the postindustrial era, e.g., capitalism, socialism, state nationalism, democracy, and authoritarianism. Are we to assume that history began
with the coming of the Machine Age? Does historical change
result only from the conflicts and contradictions that arise in
industrialized nations?
Professor Sakamoto uses dependency theory and, at times,
Marxian theory to take a stance on how the “early-starter”
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nations in the North gave rise to “world conflict” via their colonial and imperialist eras. These eras established an economic
dependency for the South and brought forth an ideological conflict in terms of human rights. Professor Sakamoto justifies taking a dependency and Marxian theoretical stance because,
unlike realism, these permit him a more dynamic view of history. I agree that this view is dynamic, but is it complete?
In later remarks, Professor Sakamoto traces the “engines of
historical change” beginning with the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which gave birth to what he defines as the
“core bloc” nations of Britain, France, and the United States. In
his eyes, this core bloc, armed with democracy, has assumed
“the role of the engine of world political and economic development” and, still further, the role of “setting the rule of development (and underdevelopment) for the rest of the world.”
I will not debate his reading of “modern history.” It would be
ludicrous to argue that developing nations have ever been
allowed to change or modify the course of modern world history in any direct way. Nevertheless, I do want to question how
Sakamoto can sum up the experience of two-thirds of the
world’s population by characterizing it as merely the “latestarters” who, therefore, develop these historical anomalies:
capitalist, nationalist, and authoritarian models (C–N–A) or the
socialist, nationalist, and authoritarian models (S–N–A). I would
suggest that these systems of government grew out of much
more profound reasons than merely the point of history at
which they began.
On a more personal note, I feel that a case should also be
made for the importance of culture in shaping history. The
diversity of cultures and the conflicts that often arise from it are
an important “engine of historical change.” In many ways, history will never be over unless we are all somehow sucked into a
uniform culture.
How can I be so sure that a uniform culture will never
develop, even under the power of democracy and capitalism? I
would argue that this is attributable to what Francis Fukuyama
called man’s “thymos,” or spirit. Fukuyama argues that man’s
thymos is satisfied only by attaining recognition in society. Furthermore, this need for recognition (or, the need to satisfy one’s
thymos) is what motivates people.
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Perhaps Fukuyama will not agree with the following, but one
learns very quickly in anthropology that every culture defines
differently what is needed to gain social recognition. What that
group decides will bring recognition is generally what that
group will use to define their view of the world and, often, to
order their society. If no culture has exactly the same view of
what it takes to be recognized, then it follows that it will always
develop unique social organizations and norms. Even when cultures come together and invariably influence one another’s
social structures and values, seldom is the end result two identical cultures. For proof of this, look how the melting pot theory in
this county has proven itself a myth. Each ethnic group has
changed with its arrival, but we have yet to fully assimilate into
one perfectly fused American society. The conflict that often
comes with this diversity continues to be a very important issue
that can still be seen as an “engine of historical change” of the
United States; the same can be said on a global level.
III. Unending Historical Conditions
Here, Professor Sakamoto returns to the power of capitalism
and democracy as engines of historical change. He proposes that
history cannot be over, as Fukuyama claimed, for there is an
inherent contradiction between capitalism and democracy.
I cannot be in complete accord with the notion that, by necessity, capitalism creates uneven, unequal, and inequitable development. Human greed does just fine with or without such a
system. Corruption, greed, and inequality still appear in socialist systems based on egalitarianism, which leads me to believe
that formal systems have less to do with equality than does the
human will.
Also, many would argue that democracy is radically different
from egalitarianism. Democracy can be seen as an ideal form of
government that permits a civil struggle for human rights. However, in my mind, this connotes that people will be given the
right to ask and fight for what they conceive to be their human
rights. It is impossible to predict whether an acceptable (or even
equitable) solution for all will result from this process. The only
guaranteed outcome a democracy provides is that one may find
a solution that the majority can live with.
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IV. Pivotal Global Problematiques
Once Professor Sakamoto has established that history will
always have new challenges to face, he moves on to state that
world history is entering a new phase in which the C-N-D
model (“the core of modernity”) has made its internal contradictions the new global problematiques that will shape world history. He identifies four that he deems critical.
A. Peace/Disparity Problematique
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the ascension of the United
States to the forefront of the new military order, he sees two
major areas of concern that this hierarchical system faces —
nuclear disarmament and the growing “ethno-cultural” security
issues.
The former, he feels, has declined in importance since the fall
of the Soviet Union. The only lasting problem is that until
nuclear disarmament is achieved, developing nations will be
tempted to prioritize nuclear weapons in their early stages of
development. These types of “security” measures are fiscal mismanagement on the part of these developing nations who are
calling for an “egalitarian military order.” This egalitarian world
order, in Professor Sakamoto’s eyes, can be found either by
equally arming the world or by equally disarming it.
This makes sense to me; however, when has a military force
ever been created from or established by the desire for equality?
The mere existence of a military force is, in the most benevolent
light, an expression of a nation’s desire for self-defense. Even
viewed from this perspective, the motivation, it seems to me, is
to gain military advantage to fend off an aggressor. This is a
recipe for armed competition.
His second area of concern is the ethno-conflicts that have
grown in number and significance since the end of the ideological Cold War. In Professor Sakamoto’s view, these moves
toward cultural/civilizational determinism are a cover for other
interests, including the socioeconomic.
Since I have already stated my view of culture as an engine of
historical change, I would merely concur with Thomas Friedman’s view that ethno-conflicts are more than a rationalization;
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they are a manifestation of attempts to balance the lure of the
capitalist world market and a very real need for a recognition of
a personal, human, and cultural identity. Economic well-being
can both heighten and lessen ethnic or cultural tensions, leading
me to believe that although they are often linked together, each
is a legitimate motivator in its own right.
B. Development/Democracy Problematique
I agree with Professor Sakamoto’s observation that since the end
of the Cold War, the strategic importance of many developing
nations has been lost. Once determined useless pawns in an ideological war, the developed nations established economic
promise as a new measure of priority for aid. However, I am not
convinced that this dilemma cannot be solved on the basis of the
logic of capitalism. It seems economically irrational for developed nations to keep two-thirds of the world’s people in abject
poverty. If the world market is to reach its greatest height,
breadth, and level of prosperity, it cannot do so by leaving twothirds of the world population disenfranchised. Democratic economic development can work if, in fact, the hegemons can be
convinced that it could work for all.
C. Environment/Democracy Problematique
Here I see the problem of definition arise in Professor
Sakamoto’s argument: democracy = equality = an egalitarian distribution of resources. This comes into conflict with his second
definition: capitalism = uneven development. He seems to argue
that the only way capitalism could ever lead to an egalitarian
society or satisfy the Benthamite principle of the “greatest happiness of the greatest number” is if our natural environment
were inexhaustible. Again, capitalism is a system of allocation of
scarce resources; that does not inherently imply or create
inequality, nor does it imply that one has a “perceived infinity of
the environment.” This is something human beings have chosen
to assume when justifying the manipulation of this capitalist
market system to their advantage.
Professor Sakamoto finally points to the crux of the definitional matter when what he is calling for is an expansion of the
209
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concept of democracy to include factors that concern the quality
of democratic life, such as ecological harmony. I agree. However, I disagree with him and Marx that “spiritual deepening” of
the kind they both suggest is tantamount to the end of capitalism or that democracy and the quality of democratic life conflict
with a capitalist system. In my opinion, this “spiritual deepening” will come from a more basic human instinct: the need to
face and conquer challenges in order to survive and, furthermore, enjoy life. Markets are used by humans in an effort to
maximize their “happiness.” Individuals can ignore the unhappiness of others for only so long, but there will come a point
where the definition of happiness will include the quality of
democratic life of all humans who find themselves sharing the
finite resources of a single planet and where the “logic of the
global market” will move to satisfy this global need as well.
V. Conclusion
Professor Sakamoto’s concluding ideas sound both wonderful
and problematic. For instance, I see a few problems with the
very institution of the UN. If nation-states are weakened by the
arduousness of reaching a national consensus, what will be the
cost of reaching a global consensus? How can the void formed by
the erosion of the nation-state be filled or compensated for by a
more “problematic” international organization? Nation-states
(especially hegemons) are critical to the formation of international or regional organizations; take away the nation-state and
the larger organization crumbles. The collapse of the League of
Nations is an example of this phenomenon. Are states truly ceding their lost authority to international organizations? If so, can
this larger structure keep peace and order in a way that better
satisfies the needs of individual world citizens? Or, will its
authority be so far removed that it will be even less effective
than the state was?
Finally, funding will always be a crucial issue. Despite the
mission to help humanity, reformed UN institutions and other
bodies will always have to bow to the interests of the big donors.
Moreover, if UN decision-making is not modified, when and
where these transnational structures get used will always be subject to the whims of the strongest nations.
210

04/19/95 11:37 AM

1833fig.qxd

Gretel S. Figueroa

If the UN cannot change, then, let us look to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). My current hope lies with them since
they have managed to free themselves from the dangers of
nationalism if not the dangers of bureaucracy. Human nature
will ultimately decide if these structures can truly remain
transnational and gain the strength to tackle the larger global
problematiques.
Perhaps Professor Sakamoto is right in identifying people as
the only hope for the North and the developing South. Unfortunately, I have very little faith in the common citizen of the North
who is content to watch the world via CNN, which caters to
human “fascination of the abomination” and seldom motivates
people into action. The South needs to overcome its social divisions and break the cycle of assumed corruption and theft and to
make a concerted effort to maximize its resources. By maximizing its talents and resources, the South can begin to manipulate
the world market in such a way that it will allow all its citizens
to live in dignity.
My experiences in Guatemala and Madagascar have made
this point all the more clear. Although the roots of these nations’
social dilemmas are found in their colonial past, the solutions
must come from those living there today. Northern NGOs can
be and are useful in this effort, but the people of the South must
begin to—and be allowed to—reassert their agency.
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